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Rising demands for quality and safety measures in high-value agriculture and livestock markets have 
necessitated the creation of increasingly complex supply chains to manage the flow of goods and 
information among channel actors.  Public–private partnerships (PPPs) can play a key role in 
strengthening links within the supply chain, particularly where market failures impede access by the poor.  
This paper examines the potential of PPPs in promoting smallholder access to such supply chains.  A 
conceptual model is presented that highlights the need to generate chain-level benefits for all channel 
participants in order for PPPs to be sustainable and to adequately address market failures.  A case of both 
a successful and a failed PPP in livestock markets illustrates the utility of this model. 
Keywords:  public–private partnerships, supply chain, high-value agriculture  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, global agriculture has been transformed from being primarily supply-driven to being 
driven by consumer demands for quality, food safety, convenience, and choice. This change has been 
fueled by the rapid consolidation of global retail chains and the development of supermarkets in 
developing countries (Regmi and Gelhar 2005; Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003).  This transition of 
agriculture from staple commodities to high-value agricultural (HVA) products clearly has wide-ranging 
implications for producers in developing countries.  While HVA goods, such as horticultural and 
livestock products, tend to be highly perishable and more susceptible to food safety problems, they also 
command higher prices than traditional staples in many markets.  Poor producers in many developing 
countries are often drawn to the financial lure of producing these goods without understanding the 
difficulties associated with their delivery to distant markets. 
The complexity of HVA necessitates a predominant role for supply chain management in the 
delivery of HVA products. The establishment of efficient supply chains requires the creation of 
relationships, networks, skills, and coordination mechanisms to manage the flow of products between 
intermediaries and to ensure that quality specifications are met.  In most cases involving HVA, the private 
sector has facilitated the establishment of networks, often sourcing from large farmers who may or may 
not contract out to smaller firms (Dolan and Humphrey 2000).  Consequently, small-scale producers are 
often left out of the process, due to their low productive capacity, remote location, and limited 
competitiveness with larger growers. Organizational challenges further impede private-sector inclusion of 
smallholders.  Although the public sector has traditionally provided services such as extension, research, 
infrastructure, and marketing outlets to smallholders, the movement toward a demand-driven agriculture, 
rather than one focused on productivity and output, limits the ability of governments to fully assist 
smallholders in the manner demanded by the marketplace. 
In the face of these market failures and externalities, public–private partnerships (PPPs) can play 
a key role in strengthening and enhancing links within the supply chain, particularly for small producers 
who may otherwise be limited in their ability to participate in innovative supply chains (Boselie, Henson, 
and Wetherspoon 2003; Hartwich, Janssen, and Tola 2003).  While the potential for PPPs in supply 
chains has been noted in past research (Boselie, Henson, and Wetherspoon 2003; Hartwich, Janssen, and 
Tola 2003; Hartwich, Gonzalez, and Vieira 2005; Duffy and Fearne 2004), the literature does not examine 
how or where PPPs can be introduced into the supply chain.  In particular, the literature has not 
systematically examined potential entry points for PPPs within the supply chain that could facilitate 
smallholder access and improve the management of the supply chain.  This suggests that a deeper 
knowledge of supply chains is required to understand the means by which PPPs can  improve the 
management of relationships within the supply chain in ways that integrate the poor and reduce market 
failures. 
 In this paper, we assess the role of PPPs as a mechanism for enhancing the involvement of the 
poor in HVA supply chains.  We first introduce concepts about supply chains and their importance in the 
delivery of HVA.  We then highlight the market failures in different parts of the supply chain that can 
limit smallholder access to HVA channels.  Using the supply chain management framework as a guide in 
our analysis, we review the traditional roles of public and private sectors in the supply chain and the 
challenges brought forth by HVA.  We then discuss the potential of PPPs as a means of overcoming these 
challenges and provide a conceptual model that defines requirements for successful intervention by PPPs 
in HVA supply chains.  This model is illustrated with the help of two case studies of livestock products in 
developing countries.  A discussion of future directions for PPPs in supply chain management concludes 
the paper.  
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2.  CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HVA SUPPLY CHAIN AND ITS MANAGEMENT 
A supply chain can be generically defined as the entire range of activities involved in the production of a 
commodity, good, or service (McGarvey and Hannon 2004).  These activities include the physical 
movement of products from raw materials to finished goods, the gathering of demand and order 
information, the logistical activities to support the procurement and information needs of the supply 
chain, the financial activities that generate revenues and finance operational aspects, and the transfer of 
technology among supply chain actors (McGarvey and Hannon 2004; van Roekel et al. 2000).  HVA 
supply chains incorporate numerous actors associated with the marketing, distribution, finance, support, 
and retail of agricultural commodities. The complexity of agricultural supply chains has increased, despite 
the fact that in many cases they have become shorter, as buyers seek to increase efficiencies and reduce 
costs associated with intermediaries (Humphrey 2005). 
Supply chains can be thought of as networks comprised of both horizontal and vertical linkages 
(Lambert and Cooper 2000) and may transcend national boundaries (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001)
1
                                                       
1  While we focus our attention on supply chains in this paper, we would argue that these perspectives would apply equally 
to value chains as found in the development literature (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001).  Indeed, the value chain literature tends to 
distinguish between supply and value chains, with the latter argued to encompass a broader range of stakeholders, relationships, 
and so forth and the former more oriented toward logistics.  However, we would argue that supply chains, as explicated in the 
modern management literature discussed in this section, are essentially synonymous with the concept of value chains as presented 
in the development literature, particularly with respect to issues of coordination, chain linkages, and relationships. 
.  
Figure 1 illustrates hypothetical supply chains for a high-value, nonprocessed agricultural commodity and 
distinguishes between modern markets (here, those that are exported to foreign retailers) and traditional 
supply chains.  In some cases, traditional and modern supply chains will overlap, for instance when 
modern supply chains rely on traditional channels to obtain any shortfall of goods from their own 
channel. Three types of “flow” can be distinguished within the supply chain: flow of material, services, 
and information. Flow of material often requires sophisticated logistics or infrastructure in modern supply 
chains, such as storage facilities or cold chains, which are lacking in traditional channels. Flow of services 
among chain actors is important because it supports chain processes and ensures that participants can 
meet specifications. Flow of information communicates characteristics related to quality, food safety, and 
consumer demand.  Note that information flows are transmitted in both directions.  Breakdowns in 
information among actors can lead to inefficiencies in the supply chain.  An example of this is the 
“bullwhip effect,” whereby information gaps among actors can lead to variability in production and 
inventories that is greater for actors upstream in the supply chain (Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang 1997).  
Modern supply chains contrast with traditional supply chains in that the flows of services and information 
are quite complex and play an important coordinating role among actors.  The organization of supply chain 
actors thus plays an important role.  
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Figure 1. A high-value agriculture supply chain  
 
Source:  Developed by the authors.   
Note:  MIS stands for Management Information Systems. 
Supply chain management refers to the process of managing, designing, transforming, and 
optimizing the flow of materials, processes, information, and services in the supply chain in a manner that 
adds value for its stakeholders (Lambert and Cooper 2000; Spekman, Kamauff, and Myhr 1998).  Supply 
chain management is thus more than just logistics.  Rather, it requires the development of mechanisms 
and linkages that coordinate stakeholders in terms of information sharing, production processes, 
standards, innovation activities, product development, and other business activities (van Roekel et al. 
2000).  A supply chain approach entails moving from a strategy applied at a firm level to one that 
incorporates the interdependencies among supply chain actors to meet consumer demand. Consequently, 
mechanisms are needed that support and manage these interdependencies effectively, since the successful 
performance of the chain requires that members act in a coordinated manner. 
Van Roekel et al. (2000) argue that supply chains create value through these types of integrated 
relationships in three ways.  First, supply chains expand the scope of markets beyond what individual 
members could achieve on their own.  Second, supply chains achieve economies of scale in terms of cost 
savings, thus raising profits for chain actors.  Finally, supply chains can better segment markets and offer 
a wider range of goods on the basis of such differentiation.  Matanda and Schroder (2002) remark that 
supply chains in horticulture can play an important role in stabilizing prices and volumes, given the 
perishability of such products. Woods (2004) notes that supply chains can reinforce the competitive 
advantage of a group of firms by reducing risks for chain participants, reinforcing cooperation, and 
serving as a source of mutual innovation.  Successful supply (or value) chains are thus able to leverage 
their relationships to produce and sustain higher rents for all chain actors.  
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The potential benefits to smallholders participating in successful supply chains are numerous.  In 
the context of agricultural supply chains, van Roekel et al. (2000) note that producers gain from increased 
knowledge, higher quality and safer food, reduced costs and losses, higher sales, and greater value added 
in production.  Consequently, consumers in particular benefit from safer, higher-quality, and lower-priced 
products.  The development of supply chains can lead to access to new markets and opportunities for 
smallholders.  For example, the rise of supermarkets in Africa and Latin America has opened new 
opportunities for producers, particularly in horticultural products (Weatherspoon and Reardon 2003). 
At the same time, there are risks to producers involved in supply chains.  Matanda and Schroder 
(2002) comment that supply chains that are tightly coordinated can actually increase uncertainty if there 
are “flow balancing problems” among channel participants. Benefits may not be equitably distributed, 
with larger farmers often gaining much more than smallholders.  In the context of agriculture, there have 
been instances in which power asymmetries between producers and retail buyers have worked to the 
detriment of small producers who cannot meet retail standards for quality or produce in consistent 
volumes (Dolan and Humphrey 2000).  Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) remark that there are risks in 
engaging in supply chains in which there is the potential for “immiserizing growth” that reduces the 
returns to activities over time.  This suggests that it is crucial that the entry point into supply chains for 
producers enables them to upgrade their position within the supply chain. 
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3.  MARKET FAILURES LIMITING SMALLHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN  
HVA SUPPLY CHAINS 
A salient feature of many HVA supply chains is the multiplicity of potential actors among upstream 
producers and traders with whom processors and retailers must coordinate and establish production 
platforms.  In many cases, there is a bias in such activities toward larger farmers that have the scale, 
income, and technical expertise to meet demanding buyer specifications (Dolan and Humphrey 2000).  
Market failures present in an economy can further exacerbate these constraints against smallholders. 
We can identify several types of interrelated market failures and associated transaction costs that 
smallholders face in accessing HVA supply chains.  First, actors in the supply chain may experience 
information asymmetries and high transaction costs. Small- and medium-scale producers may not 
participate in growing markets for HVA commodities because they may have difficulty guaranteeing that 
the products they produce meet mandated food safety and quality requirements. Because of information 
asymmetries, both the producer and the consumer may have limited knowledge of the food safety 
problems associated with the inputs they use in production or of problems that may occur in the 
processing and delivery of the product as it proceeds through the supply chain.  Problems can arise from 
the quality of inputs or their misuse or from the growth and transport of microbial pathogens and 
mycotoxins; these problems can be magnified as products move along the supply chain.  Moreover, the 
supply chain in many developing countries is often characterized by anonymous transactions in spot 
markets, implying limited communication and coordination among farmers, traders, and consumers.  This 
lack of coordination, coupled with poor infrastructure and insufficient cold storage systems, creates an 
environment in which market participants have little incentive to reduce microbial pathogens, 
mycotoxins, and pesticide residues (Narrod et al. 2005).   
Such market failures make it difficult for many developing countries to conduct traceability 
programs for product differentiation or food safety.  To implement standards, it is necessary to establish 
processes to control for food hazards or specifications throughout the whole supply chain. Though private 
institutions aligned with supermarkets are beginning to provide technical assistance to their suppliers to 
ensure the delivery of products with certain safety standards to high-end markets, it is not clear if the 
private supply of traceability meets or falls below socially desirable levels.  Moreover, while this 
mechanism may be in place for the suppliers of products going to specific markets, the majority of the 
agricultural production in developing countries still remains in the hands of poor households which are 
not necessarily aligned to multinational supply chains and may not receive the type of technical assistance 
needed to ensure that their suppliers meet a certain level of standards. 
Coordinated systems provide the potential to ensure that certain measures are met by the suppliers 
of specific products, allowing food to be traced back to suppliers if food-borne disease outbreaks occur.  
While it may be possible to trace a product when the supply chain actors are known, at least two 
situations may result in inadequate standards in infrastructure.  As noted by Busby and Mitchell et al. 
(2006), the first situation arises from the public goods nature of these standards, which can lead to a free-
rider problem and an underinvestment in the provision of infrastructure.  The second situation is 
coordination failure, in which asymmetric incentives lead participants to pursue investments that are 
suboptimal for the industry as a whole.  Relying on the private sector to deliver information may not lead 
to an efficient outcome, particularly when a country may be trying to obtain a disease- or pest-free status 
or establish traceability capabilities and certification schemes. 
Delgado, Narrod, and Tiongco (2008) further suggest that transaction cost barriers hinder 
smallholder participation in markets.  Transaction costs are the costs of exchange that arise from 
asymmetries in access to information and assets across market actors.  If both buyers and sellers can 
easily ascertain the quality of the item being sold and the prices in alternative markets at the time of sale, 
there are no asymmetries in information and the transaction costs of exchange are low.  However, if 
buyers cannot be sure of the true quality of the good they are purchasing, they will be less willing to pay a 
premium for it based on claimed quality.  
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Transaction costs are especially prevalent in the livestock product business and clearly play a role 
in the displacement of smallholders, as markets become more demanding in terms of information about 
the quality of the product at the time of sale.  Delgado, Narrod, and Tiongco (2008) give two examples of 
transaction costs involving livestock producers that concern the safety of inputs and outputs. In the first 
case, because information about purchased inputs, such as feeds in developing countries, is often 
unreliable, larger producers often assure feed quality by mixing their own feeds. In the Philippines, large-
scale hog producers mix their own feed because poor quality feeds produce off-flavors that can only be 
detected upon consumption of the final product. In doing so, these large producers receive higher prices 
per unit than small-scale producers by developing a steady clientele that has confidence in the safety and 
quality of the product originating from this group (Costales et al. 2003). 
A second case study reveals that smallholders have difficulties selling milk outside the local 
market because purchasers in anonymous markets cannot be sure without a bacteriological test that the 
milk is safe.  By contrast, large-scale producers and cooperatives of small-scale producers may be able to 
establish trust and reputation in markets.  This situation occurs in the Indian dairy industry where such 
groups depend on repeat sales to the same clients who can identify the source of the milk (Delgado, 
Narrod, and Tiongco 2008; Sharma et al. 2003). 
An additional reason for the exclusion of smallholders from many forms of agricultural 
production in developing countries is that they cannot compete with the larger operations which benefit 
from technical and allocative economies of scale. Organizational constraints can further dampen the 
participation of smallholders in HVA supply chains.  In addition to facing information asymmetries and 
transaction costs in exchange, smallholders themselves, because of their small scale, may not be able to 
perform many of the actions necessary to be incorporated in HVA supply chains, such as quality control, 
handling, and storage (Bienabe and Sautier 2005).  Where smallholders can participate in HVA supply 
chains, they often lack the ability to upgrade to or adopt innovative marketing activities; they are 
constrained by limited bargaining power that reduces the benefits of their participation and their ability to 
market products directly (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001).  The development of horizontal linkages through 
farm associations or cooperatives is one means by which producers can effectively scale up production 
and engender better access to more modern supply chains.  Bienabe and Sautier (2005) note that producer 
organizations serve more than just coordinating roles: they also bring members financial benefits and 
increased capacity, information, and advocacy vis-à-vis other supply chain actors.  At the same time, they 
remark that these forms of organization are themselves subject to transaction costs in organization, as it 
can be difficult to communicate the benefits of group organization and coordinate smallholders along 
such lines.  Free-rider problems in horizontally linked groups can become especially acute.   
Finally, regulatory failures are a significant aspect of developing countries and contribute to the 
underdevelopment of supply chains themselves.  Government overregulation, taxes, or tariffs can raise the 
cost of supply chain development and lower the benefits of participation for all members.  Limits or bans 
on foreign investment may make it impossible for foreign participants to enter a market and bring needed 
technical expertise and coordination activities to a potential supply chain.  While the private sector can 
compensate (and often has) for government underregulation in the form of standards or certification 
programs by creating private standards, this often leads to smallholders being left out of HVA channels 
(Reardon et al. 2001).  Even when regulatory norms are appropriate, changes in consumer demand can 
have negative impacts on smallholders if retailer sourcing decisions change in response (Humphrey 
2005). 
At the same time, it is true that many of the adverse circumstances facing smallholders could be 
attributed to “bad luck,” happenstance, or isolation from markets.  Smallholders may not be competitive 
by virtue of high unit costs that are exacerbated by small landholdings and/or distance to markets. 
However, while such problems may not be considered market failures as such, there may be important 
institutional and regulatory subtexts behind those issues that themselves are market failures.  For instance, 
while limited competitiveness related to small landholdings is not per se a market failure, if land tenure 
rights are absent or credit markets are imperfect, then the ability of smallholders to engage in HVA is 
constrained by implicit contextual market failures that themselves needed remedying.  
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Historically, the public sector has been responsible for finding remedies to market failures.  
However, the ability of the public sector in developing countries to establish standards and provide the 
needed infrastructure, institutions, and monitoring capabilities throughout the supply chain is limited.  
The absence or malfunctioning of strong public support institutions, such as agricultural extension, rural 
banks, input providers, or market information services, further thwart the public sector’s capabilities. 
Firms sometimes try to assume these roles in the absence of strong public support. Through private 
hierarchy, alliances, strategic interaction, third-party certification efforts, and collective association, firms 
often profit from the resolution of market failure.  Occasionally, the existence of a market failure benefits 
firms; therefore, there is no incentive to correct it. More frequently, however, the market failure costs the 
firm in terms of reduced sales or added costs. In such cases, firms have an incentive, either alone or in 
aggregate, to correct the market failure, although their efforts are not likely to reach small-scale producers 
that are not suppliers to their supply chain. Relying on the private sector to correct the market failure may 
thus result in a suboptimal correction of the market failure if the private costs and benefits of 
implementing controls are not the same as the social costs and benefits.  Resolving these public good and 
coordination failures often requires intervention from an organization outside of industry or government. 
The market failures described above suggest a role for specific interventions by the public sector, 
the private sector, or a combination of both. Indeed, because supply chain management requires the 
coordination of actors and activities (that is, “chain solutions”), the most appropriate interventions for 
ensuring that market failure corrections are equitable and reach smallholders may be those that combine 
public intervention in one portion of the supply chain and private participation in another.  PPPs that rely 
on the strength of each sector to deliver certain functions along the supply chain may result in the optimal 
correction of market failures and the meeting of societal objectives. 
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4.  INSTITUTIONS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: 
TRADITIONAL ROLES AND CHALLENGES OF HVA 
In this section, we discuss the traditional roles of different institutions involved in managing particular 
aspects of the supply chain.  This section serves as a precursor to the development of a methodology that 
demonstrates how PPPs in supply chains can coordinate public and private actors in chain-level 
interventions for poverty alleviation, given that the market failures and challenges presented in HVA 
supply chains may require a more integrative approach. 
The complexity of supply chains implies that there are many possible entry points for both public 
and private intervention.  As a point of synthesis and further elaboration, it is useful to delineate the 
activities undertaken in a supply chain more rigorously and explicitly in order to understand and define 
the potential roles for public and private institutions.  Our starting point is the supply chain model of 
Cooper, Lambert, and Pagh (1997), which highlights the networks of activities and processes in the 
supply chain.  Each actor in the supply chain will carry out a number of different internal activities (of 
varying degrees of importance, depending on the actor), including production, purchase of inputs, 
logistics, marketing and sales, financial management, and research and development.  Along the supply 
chain itself, there will also exist a number of important processes that supply each firm’s activities and 
integrate actors along the supply chain.  These processes include managing customer relationships and 
demand, fulfilling orders, procuring materials, and engaging in chain-level research and development 
(R&D) and marketing.  Figure 2 illustrates this model in a diagram and shows how supply chain 
processes link different participants in the supply chain, while revealing the main internal competencies 
undertaken at the firm level. 
Figure 2. Activities and processes involved in supply chain management  
 



































While agricultural supply chains differ from manufacturing supply chains, they nonetheless share 
many of the same types of activities and processes.  We adapt this framework to identify the activities 
(Table 1) and processes (Table 2) that play a predominant role in HVA supply chains in developing 
countries. We maintain the internal activities: production, input purchases, logistics, marketing, credit 
(finance in Figure 2), and technological development.  Key processes that support these internal activities 
include extension services (related to product development and commercialization in Figure 2), 
infrastructure development (such as storage facilities, related to issues of manufacturing flow 
management), information systems (akin to order fulfillment and demand management), and certification, 
grades, and standards (related to demand management and customer service management).  An additional 
process not explicitly shown in Figure 2 is the organizational mechanisms that coordinate supply chain 
actors at key points in the supply chain and provide information about supply chain specifications, such as 
contracts and other forms of vertical and horizontal coordination (Bienabe and Sautier 2005).  Table 1 and 
2 highlight the traditional roles played by different public and private institutions in each of these 
activities and processes.  We further indicate the challenges that HVA supply chains impose on these 
functions. 
Table 1. Institutional roles in the supply chain management of high-value agriculture: Activities 
Supply chain 
activity 





point for PPPs and 
NGOs  Public sector  Private sector 
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agencies and private 
sector buyers using 






















lack of credit 
access for inputs 
Creation of producer 
organizations to 
procure high-quality 
inputs in bulk to 
reduce costs 
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market access for 
remote areas 
Development of 
partnerships to link 
distribution 
activities in remote 
communities  
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specifications of 
brands 
Use of producer 
organizations or 




retailers to promote 
innovative or 
socially beneficial 
products and create 
brands  
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Table 1. Continued 
Supply chain 
activity 





point for PPPs and 
NGOs  Public sector  Private sector 










Access to credit to 
purchase high-
quality inputs and 
finance  
Smallholders’ 
access to credit 
limited by high 
transaction costs 
and rationing in 
credit provision  
Provision of 
microcredit by 



































beneficial inputs to 
production 
Source:  Developed by the authors. 
Notes:  SCM is supply chain management, PPP is public–private partnerships, and NGOs are nongovernmental organizations 
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to jointly finance and 
maintain roads, storage 
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that manage quality and 





































Third-party PPP to 
underwrite and monitor 
contracts; development 




Source:  Developed by the authors.  
Notes:  SCM is supply chain management, PPP is public–private partnerships, NGOs are nongovernmental organizations, HVA 
is high-value agriculture, and ISO is International Organization for Standardization. 
For supply chain activities, the public sector has traditionally provided regulatory and support 
measures.  Production and procurement activities have been facilitated (or, in many cases, taxed) by input 
and output price policies.  In some cases, state-owned enterprises have played (and sometimes still play) a 
prominent role in downstream processing and marketing activities, often to the detriment of the private 
sector.  The public sector has had a large role in research, information, and extension activities, though 
the effectiveness and financing of such activities have been waning.  Moreover, many of the techniques 
fostered under traditional public extension and research are not directed toward production of specialized 
high-value commodities; information resources are biased toward low-value, staple products.  Likewise, 
while many regulations are in place to support HVA supply chains, particularly in terms of certification, 
food safety standards, and monitoring activities, enforcement is often lacking, while regulations are not 
credible to either producers or buyers. Combined, traditional public functions are increasingly unable to  
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meet the array of standards demanded by HVA supply chains; thus, smallholders are disadvantaged in the 
process. 
The private sector has traditionally been directly involved in the production, marketing, and 
distribution of agricultural commodities, with the rise in HVA commodities giving an ever larger and 
more specific role to private actors.  At the same time, the attributes of HVA, in terms of specialized 
production, knowledge, and capacity, lead private-sector actors away from smallholders and toward larger 
farmers who can more easily meet the rigid standards and food safety requirements of foreign buyers.  
This is reinforced by the need to develop organizational modalities (contracts, for example) that link 
supply chain participants.  While private-sector actors may wish to diversify their sourcing activities and 
procure from a mix of farmers, including smallholders, the income, credit, and resource constraints of 
smallholders present a challenge to the private sector. In particular, the creation of horizontal linkages to 
scale up producers through producer organizations presents difficulties to the public and private sectors 
alike. 
The difficulties and challenges faced in new HVA supply chains imply that there may be 
potential synergies in partnering the roles of the public and private sectors to develop innovative solutions 
for smallholder participation.  In particular, the development of supply chains and effective supply chain 
management in HVA necessitates a host of coordinating and integrating mechanisms that neither private 
nor public entities may be able to provide on their own.  In Tables 1 and 2, we also illustrate the potential 
role of PPPs in the activities of an HVA supply chain.  Possible areas of PPP involvement include the 
organization of producer associations for marketing and credit, development of public–private research 
consortiums for disseminating new varieties, brokerage of linkages between smallholders and processors, 
and creation of third-party certification and monitoring groups, all with a combination of public and 
private resources. 
The general argument for PPPs rests on the idea that partnering allows actors to pool resources 
and risk regarding investments in research and innovations to achieve mutual benefits in ways that would 
not be possible without the partnership (Hartwich, Gonzalez, and Vieira 2005).  In the presence of market 
failures where some sort of intervention is required, PPPs often have an advantage over pure public 
intervention in that they bring forth the best aspects of private-sector involvement (namely, an orientation 
toward efficiency and optimal resource use) with the social welfare aspects of the public sector (Spielman 
and von Grebmer 2003).  The market failures that prevent smallholders from accessing HVA supply 
chains may not be resolved through private-sector intervention alone.  Humphrey (2005) cites a number 
of advantages held by smallholders in HVA supply chains, including the desire of buyers to diversify 
supply sources, restrictions or transaction costs with other suppliers, and locational advantages.  However, 
as noted previously, the private sector also faces large transaction costs in developing a supply base, 
particularly in upgrading farm capacity, which may work against the large-scale integration of 
smallholders.  Likewise, public-sector interventions to integrate smallholders into HVA supply chains 
may not be sufficiently targeted to meet the specialized demands of HVA buyers.  Traditional public-
sector activities such as extension, research and development, and price and marketing policies have been 
largely commodity-based and may not provide the support that smallholders require in an HVA supply 
chain.  By contrast, a partnering approach between the public and private sectors in HVA chains 
potentially resolves these constraints by allowing jointly funded investments in groups (such as 
smallholders) that may otherwise be excluded and that would benefit from participating in HVA supply 
chains.  In the next section, we discuss a framework to assess how PPPs can be incorporated into HVA 
supply chains. 
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5.  A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF PPPS IN HVA SUPPLY CHAINS 
Given that PPPs could help resolve the market failures experienced by smallholders in accessing HVA 
supply chains, it is important to try to determine their potential entry points and requirements for their 
establishment.  Tables 1 and 2 in the previous section enumerated a number of possible entry points for 
potential PPPs at discrete points in the supply chain.  However, as noted by Spekman, Kamauff, and 
Myhr (1998), successful supply chain management requires “the entire supply chain moving in unison, 
sharing similar goals and objectives.” The coordination of disparate actors and institutions through both 
horizontal and vertical linkages is required.  We thus posit that the entry point for PPPs, particularly those 
that increase smallholder participation in the supply chain, does not necessarily stem from the creation of 
partnerships in discrete components of the supply chain (such as extension, credit, and marketing). 
Rather, it comes from the development of coordinated approaches at key bottlenecks in the supply chain 
that leverage the strengths of public- and private-sector intervention into chain-level solutions. In essence, 
a successful PPP would “coordinate coordination” to raise the efficiency of marketing channels that 
include smallholders.  A PPP in one point of a specific supply chain could further organize and bring 
together public and private actors in other parts of the chain.  
At the same time, the creation of PPPs entails considerable transaction costs of their own, in 
terms of coordination, information, communication, and other indirect costs (Hartwich, Gonzalez, and 
Tola 2005).  Successful PPPs must induce benefits that outweigh the costs of organization.  Hartwich, 
Gonzalez, and Tola (2005) provide three requirements that underpin the creation of a PPP:  (1) the 
existence of common interests between public and private parties, (2) positive benefit-cost ratios to PPP 
participation for both the public and private sectors, and (3) the potential for the creation of synergies 
among public and private participants.  However, given the coordination costs and chain-level synergies 
that must exist within a supply chain, we further posit that PPPs in HVA supply chains must provide 
additional benefits to the entire supply chain that exceed both the total costs of supply chain coordination 
and the costs of a potential public–private partnership.  Moreover, while PPPs in discrete activities 
typically generate discrete benefits to the public or private actor, the benefits generated by a PPP in a 
supply chain must also derive from the success of the entire supply chain, in addition to any private 
benefits to the partners. 
The preceding analysis allows us to suggest a conceptual framework for the role of PPPs in the 
integration of smallholders in HVA supply chains.  For PPPs to induce the successful participation of 
smallholders in HVA supply chains, we hypothesize that the following four requirements must be 
satisfied: 
1.  The benefits to the targeted beneficiary (the smallholder) from the PPP must be greater than 
the costs associated with participation costs. 
2.  The benefits to public partners in the PPP must be greater than the public costs of partnering. 
3.  The overall net benefits to private partners in the PPP must be greater than the overall net 
private benefits of partnering without the PPP. 
4.  The benefits to the entire supply chain resulting from the PPP must be greater than the 
associated costs to the chain. 
We illustrate this framework in Figures 3 and 4.  In Figure 3, we map a simple HVA supply chain 
in which smallholders participate with three other actors—an extension agency, a processor, and a 
retailer.  In Figure 3, we assume that market failures exist in the provision of high-quality varieties from 
extension services to smallholders and that there is limited market access from the farmgate to the 
processor (due to limited logistical capabilities and poor market information about downstream markets, 
for example). The dotted arrows connecting smallholders to extension services and processors indicate 
these market failures.  In Figure 4, we illustrate two potential PPPs that attempt to correct the two market 
failures presented in this supply chain.  These PPPs could include a research consortium to improve 
varieties sold to producers and a marketing organization that acts as a broker between farmers and  
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processors and is jointly funded by public and private funds.  The success of these partnerships must 
induce positive benefits (represented by + signs) for each partner, the beneficiary (smallholder) targeted 
by the intervention, and the supply chain as a whole.  Figure 4 highlights the need for partnerships at 
different points of the chain, based on both horizontal and vertical market failures, given the chain 
externalities that market failures at one point in the supply chain can induce.  We should note that some 
market failures will necessitate a purely public or a purely private solution, depending on the relative 
benefits of each in correcting the market failure compared with a PPP. 
Figure 3. Market failures in a simple supply chain  
 
Source:  Developed by the authors. 
Figure 4. Contributions of PPPs in correcting market failures in supply chains 
 
Source:  Developed by the authors. 
 Note:  PPPs are public–private partnerships.  
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The benefits to the entire supply chain (requirement 4) from a PPP depend largely on the dynamic 
and intrachain measures that are induced by a PPP.  Successful PPPs in supply chains should generate 
positive chain externalities, such that the benefits to smallholders transmit positively to create benefits 
and investment incentives for downstream and upstream actors.  Correspondingly, these will lead to 
benefits for the supply chain as a whole. Since interactions in a supply chain are dynamic, the benefits of 
an intervention may have effects (positive or negative) that are not immediately noticed; thus, the benefits 
of a PPP may occur with a lag as the effects of the PPP are transmitted to different actors over time.  
Hartwich, Gonzalez, and Tola (2005) further note that the benefits from a PPP depend on investments 
made by each actor in developing the partnership.  If we extend this analysis to each member of the 
supply chain, noting the multiplicity of links among different actors in the supply chain and their effects 
on one another, this implies that the following, stated as our fifth requirement, is true: 
5.  The benefits to any supply chain participant at any period of time from a PPP-led intervention 
will depend both on the investments made by that participant in the supply chain that are 
induced by the PPP and on those taken by other actors in the supply chain that are directly 
linked with that participant. 
We note that there could be differential sensitivity to PPP interventions depending on where in 
the supply chain such activities are undertaken, given that different supply chain participants may have 
more or fewer linkages than other supply chain actors (Rich, Winter-Nelson, and Brozovic 2005). 
A study of the tea sector in Viet Nam (ADB 2004) illustrates the importance of these interchain 
externalities.  In this supply chain, the fundamental constraint to the sector was the low quality of the tea, 
which prevented access to high-value domestic and international markets.  Low quality in the tea sector 
arose from a number of sources: poor productivity of old tea plants, underuse and misuse of inputs, poor 
processing technology, and limited coordination in production and marketing within the supply chain.  
However, as correctly noted by the ADB (2004), interventions that focused on each constraint in isolation 
might not solve the key channel-wide constraint.  For instance, improving productivity through PPPs in 
extension activities would not address the processing constraints downstream.  While raising smallholder 
productivity would have a positive first-round effect, the net effect on the chain would be negative in the 
absence of other exogenous activities, since the intervention could exacerbate bottlenecks downstream in 
processing and exports that would result in a negative impact on the chain itself which, in turn, would 
reduce the benefits to smallholders and PPPs over time. 
An important challenge will be to determine the best ways to integrate PPPs into chain-level 
activities that both resolve market failures and are responsive to consumer demand.  A majority of PPPs 
in agriculture cited in the literature are in agricultural research activities (Spielman and von Gremer 
2003).  The dynamics and complexities of HVA supply chains necessitate the creation of innovative PPPs 
that generate linkages at different points in the supply chain (not just on varieties) to bring smallholders 
into markets in ways that are sustainable from the standpoint of income generation.  This suggests that 
such partnerships will need to consider marketing and information activities, for example, as an important 
part of their portfolio in addition to traditional PPP interventions at the upstream level. 
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6.  APPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL PPP MODEL:  
CASE STUDIES OF SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL PARTNERSHIPS IN 
LIVESTOCK MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Mother Dairy: A Way to Link Small-Scale Dairy Producers to Urban Markets
2
The Mother Dairy project in India was implemented to link small-scale producers to consumers through 
the use of village cooperatives and the aid of the public sector in providing needed infrastructure.  India’s 
dairy industry has traditionally been dominated by the traditional unorganized sector that marketed their 
liquid milk to urban areas through milk vendors (dudhias) and sweet shops. 
 
According to Sharma et al. (2003), the reasons for the persistence of a large traditional sector 
were twofold.  First, Indian consumers were unwilling to pay the additional costs of pasteurization and 
packaging, which can raise retail prices by more than 100 percent.  Second, consumers often regarded raw 
milk and traditional products obtained from reliable vendors as of better quality than formally processed 
dairy products.  Correspondingly, small-scale dairy producers were caught in a situation of low returns, 
inaccessibility of resources and markets, and nonavailability of adequate production inputs and services. 
The dependence on milk vendors was further aggravated by poor quality infrastructure.  
Moreover, these producers faced challenges in terms of information asymmetries, organization failures, 
and transaction costs. Their distance from the market thwarted their ability to obtain knowledge about the 
uniformity, consistency, and safety measures demanded by the urban market. Farmers further relied on a 
series of intermediaries who obtained a large share of the profit in the supply chain. 
Over the years, the government has tried to alter the situation and distribute dairy products to 
urban consumers.  In 1959, the government-funded Delhi Milk Scheme adopted a method of departmental 
milk procurement from the milk-producing areas around Delhi through the establishment of its own milk 
collection and chilling centers.  Though the collection was initially started with small milk vendors, big 
contractors were ultimately created who purchased milk from small vendors and supplied it in bulk to the 
milk scheme.  By the late 1960s, the government changed its strategy to focus its dairy development 
efforts on producers' cooperatives and milk production based on milk sheds in rural areas, modeled on the 
successful experience of the Kaira District Cooperative Milk Producers’ Union, better known as Amul or 
the “Anand Pattern.” 
The Mother Dairy Supply Chain Structure  
In 1971, the Government of India launched a massive dairy development program known as Operation 
Flood, which was built on the Amul success.  The Anand Pattern is a three-tiered structure in which 
farmers organize themselves into dairy cooperative societies at the village level. These village-level 
cooperatives are further organized into district-level unions, which are federated into a state-level 
cooperative organization (Figure 5).  Under this program, rural producers were organized into 
cooperatives so they would have an assured market, remunerative prices, and inputs and services for milk 
production enhancement, such as better feed and fodder, breed improvement through artificial 
insemination, and disease control measures. At the national level, the National Cooperative Dairy 
Federation of India coordinated the efforts of all state-level cooperative dairy federations.   
                                                       
2 This description of the Mother Dairy Project is summarized from the report written by Sharma et al. 2003.   
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Figure 5. Activities and organization of the Mother Dairy milk cooperative  
 
Source:  Sharma et al. 2003.  
Note:  AI stands for artificial insemination. 
Growth of the Mother Dairy Procurement Process   
Since the 1970s, the Mother Dairy approach has expanded. It is presently a large, integrated cooperative 
structure that procures, processes, distributes, and markets dairy products to urban consumers.  As of 
December 2002, about 101,000 dairy cooperative societies had been organized, involving about 11.2 
million farmers.  With the support of professional management, producers decide on their own business 
policies, adopt modern production and marketing techniques, and receive services that they could neither 
afford nor manage individually.  The institutional infrastructure—village cooperatives, dairy and cattle 
feed plants, state and national marketing—is still owned and controlled by farmers, and the state provides 
the infrastructure to market the products in urban areas.  As a result, the milk-processing capacity in the 
country has increased substantially, rising from 10,000–20,000 liters per day in the 1950s to 100,000 
liters per day in the 1970s, 500,000 liters per day in the 1980s, and more than 1 million liters per day in 
the 1990s.    
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Market Failures that Have Been Addressed and Those Remaining 
The Mother Dairy approach has succeeded in correcting the market failures of asymmetric information, 
organization failures, and high transaction costs for farmers who market their produce through village 
cooperatives.  Looking at our model, the three-tiered structure of the cooperative system served to induce 
partnerships at different points in the supply chain in which such market failures were present.  These 
joint efforts further ensured that the benefits of such partnerships exceeded their organization costs.  At 
the same time, further research is needed to determine the scope of Mother Dairy in reaching all 
smallholders.  Research is also needed to assess the competitiveness of Mother Dairy with the private 
sector, which has become more active since a partial decontrol of the dairy sector in the 1990s resulted in 
many private players entering the market and setting up milk processing facilities.   
PPPs for Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Control in Brazil and Bordering Countries  
FMD has been endemic in South America for over a century.  While rarely fatal in mature livestock, 
FMD presents particular problems to export-oriented beef producers, given its rapid spread and the 
segmentation of world beef markets by a country’s FMD status.  In particular, price premiums exist for 
exporting countries that are free of FMD, with even higher prices available to those exporters that remain 
free of FMD without vaccination.  As current technology limits the ability to distinguish between meat 
from an infected animal and one that has been vaccinated with the FMD vaccine, thus generating an 
immune response, risk-averse markets such as Japan and Korea pay a premium for meat from countries 
that are both FMD-free and that control the disease without vaccination.  Such price incentives have made 
FMD control an attractive prospect in South America, although control efforts in exporting regions have 
been compromised by their own erratic budgetary support to veterinary services for surveillance and 
vaccine purposes and by the lax control efforts of poorer, smallholder-based neighbors (Rich, Winter-
Nelson, and Brozovic 2005).  Clearly, there is a need for intervention to address the market failures and 
externalities created by FMD.  PPPs have a potential role in overcoming these externalities, given that the 
extensive and disparate nature of livestock production in South America makes it difficult (and 
expensive) for public or private solutions alone to sustainably control FMD. 
In recent years, Brazil has become the world’s largest beef exporter. Brazil’s emergence in 
international beef markets has provided it with significant incentives to eradicate FMD, given the 
aforementioned segmentation of export markets based on FMD status.  Following the major outbreak in 
2000, Brazil eliminated FMD through vaccination in 15 states, comprising 84 percent of its cattle herd, 
and set a target date of 2006 to be entirely FMD-free (USDA-FAS 2005).  Much of this success has been 
attributed to successful PPPs in animal health programs and to an ambitious traceability program, known 
as SISBOV, to identify and certify all cattle born in or imported into Brazil (Dubois and Moura 2004).  
However, in October 2005, an outbreak of FMD was reported in Mato Grosso du Sul, home to 
more than 24 million head of cattle.  Subsequent outbreaks were found in the state of Paraná. While 
eradication efforts are ongoing, the World Animal Health Organization (or OIE, by its French acronym) 
stripped several Brazilian states of their FMD-free-with-vaccination status, and more than 50 markets 
have banned Brazilian beef exports.  Export losses were estimated to exceed $1 billion.   
The conceptual model presented in this paper hypothesizes that successful supply chain 
partnerships must create benefits that are transmitted upstream and downstream for all members of the 
supply chain.  From this perspective, the root cause of Brazil’s failure to control FMD at this time through 
PPPs would lie in the limited disbursement of benefits of FMD control throughout the supply chain 
(requirements 4 and 5).  A detailed examination of the structure of this supply chain and these 
partnerships in the following sections highlights this phenomenon, as well as other limitations of Brazil’s 
PPP model.  
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The Supply Chain Structure  
A simplified supply chain for beef production in Brazil is presented in Figure 6, including the PPPs 
existing in the sector. Similar to much of South America, livestock production in Brazil is of an extensive 
nature, with cattle reared and fattened on large ranches.  Marketed cattle are typically sold at auction, 
from where they are sent to finishing yards and then to slaughterhouses.  At each step of the supply chain, 
various types of support services are provided to producers through PPPs, including extension support for 
FMD control, traceability programs, and market promotion activities.  First, the disbursement of vaccines 
and provision of vaccination for cattle in Brazil is a collaborative effort between the public (federal and 
state) and private sectors, with different responsibilities allotted to each party.  The federal government is 
specifically tasked with the maintenance of surveillance and disease information systems, quality control 
for vaccines, tracking of animal movements, and diagnostic and laboratory facilities.  State governments 
are in charge of inspection services (animals and vaccination services), local surveillance, and monitoring 
of local movements.  The private sector is in charge of the actual administration of vaccinations, 
coordination with public bodies, and emergency health actions as needed (Dubois and Moura 2004).  All 
parties are jointly responsible for promoting animal health education and vigilance activities among 
farmers.  In certain states, the private sector manages a compensation payment program in the event of a 
disease outbreak to induce better control practices among farmers (Delgado, Narrod, and Tiongco 2008). 
Figure 6. A simplified supply chain for beef in Brazil 
 
Source:  Developed by the authors, based on Dubois and Moura 2004.  
Notes:   PPP refers to public–private partnerships, FMD is foot-and-mouth disease, SISBOV is the Brazilian Identification and 
Certification System of Bovine and Bubaline Origin, and ABIEC is the Brazilian Beef Industries Export Association. 
Likewise, the traceability system for export-destined beef is designed to be a joint public–private 
venture.  The SISBOV program began in 2002 to trace the birthplace, production system, movements, 
vaccination details, sales, and slaughter of all cattle either born in Brazil or imported from foreign 
countries.  SISBOV is implemented through 30 private agencies that have each been certified by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food Supply (USDA-FAS 2005).  The SISBOV program is being 
gradually scaled up in a phased manner; by the end of 2007, all beef produced in Brazil was to fall under  
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the SISBOV program.  The cost of the program is funded through a US$2.50 fee per animal and is 
expected to cost US$400 million once fully implemented (USDA-FAS 2002, 2003) 
Finally, additional PPPs are in place on the marketing side in export markets.  Promotion 
activities are the purview of the Brazilian Beef Processors and Exporters Association (ABIEC), which 
engages in trade lobbying and marketing in overseas markets and works in conjunction with the export 
promotion agencies of the Ministry of Agriculture (USDA-FAS 2005). 
Problems of the Brazil PPP Model in FMD Control 
The supply chain and supporting PPPs in Figure 6 are a prima facie example of a coordinated sector that 
has successfully managed the externalities caused by FMD.  Indeed, in their profile on the partnerships in 
the beef industry in Brazil, Dubois and Moura (2004) laud it as such: “Thanks to the active participation 
of producers and all members of the supply chain in efforts to eradicate FMD, Brazil has been able to 
hoist itself to the position of leading producer of beef in the world."   But less than two years later, Brazil 
was reeling from an FMD outbreak that has impacted exports to two of its largest markets (the E.U. and 
Russia) and limited exports to dozens of other countries.  What happened? 
First, the supply chain in Figure 6 is much more complicated, particularly due to the presence of 
other channels that interact with the supply chain in Brazil.   In particular, Brazil, like other countries in 
the Mercosur region, receives (often illegal) imports of cattle from Paraguay, a country in which FMD 
control has been problematic.  While information on the import of cattle from Paraguay is generally 
anecdotal, press reports from the 2005 outbreak suggest that the disease may have entered through cattle 
imported from Paraguay.
3
                                                       
3  See “Brazil State Suspects Foot-and-Mouth Came From Paraguay,” CattleNetwork.com, October, 14, 2005. Retrieved at 
  Indeed, an examination of price differentials between Paraguay and its 
Mercosur neighbors reveals significant incentives for moving cattle from Paraguay to Brazil during 2003–
04 in particular (Figure 7).  It should also be noted that price differentials between Paraguay and 
Argentina/Uruguay were high prior to the FMD outbreaks in those countries in 2001.  
http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=11533.   
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Figure 7. Prices for live animals in Mercosur countries, 2000–04 
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Partnerships that bring chain-wide benefits to the beef sector would clearly need to address this 
negative externality from Paraguay, particularly since as a larger supply chain, PPPs developed in Brazil 
would ideally need to induce positive spillovers downstream in Paraguay (requirements 4 and 5).  Brazil 
has recognized this as a problem and has been at the forefront of regional efforts to eliminate disease in 
neighboring countries in South America.  For instance, in 2004, Brazil donated 1 million doses of FMD 
vaccine to Bolivia and 500,000 doses to Paraguay to assist with regional efforts to fight FMD.  However, 
sustainable disease control requires concerted efforts to finance and maintain surveillance programs over 
time.  As the model shows, the benefits of the partnership for both the public and private sectors must 
exceed their costs over a long time period (requirements 2 and 3). Correa Melo and Saraiva (2003) note 
that the experience in South America with FMD eradication efforts has been a reduction in public and 
private commitments to disease control once the program has reached a certain threshold of success.  
Table 3 illustrates expenditures on animal health in Brazil during 1993–2002 and highlights this 
phenomenon.  While the private sector clearly plays an important role in funding disease mitigation 
programs, the table also shows a sharp reduction in the level of public commitment to disease control in 
2002 after a sharp increase during the late 1990s and early 2000s.  Moreover, total commitments by both 
the public and private sectors fell in 2002, casting some doubts on the long-term perspectives of such 
partnerships.  Press reports from 2004 and 2005 reveal further sharp reductions in animal health budgets 
in Brazil.  For example, the Irish Farmers Journal found that the 2004 budget for animal health in Brazil 
of US$18 million was just one-half the level of the previous year. Likewise, CattleNetwork.com reported 
that only 12 percent of the 2005 budget allocated to animal health was spent prior to the October 2005 
outbreak, while the BBC noted that US$1.5 million had been withheld from the 2005 budget earmarked 
for combating animal diseases.
4
Table 3. Expenditures on animal health by the public and private sectors in Brazil, 1992–2003 
  Given the importance of the public sector in areas such as surveillance, 
reductions in funds by the public sector could have put the effectiveness of existing PPPs in jeopardy.   



















1992  7.665  2.666  10.331  74.651  84.982  9%  3%  88% 
1993  7.292  1.013  8.305  75.883  84.188  9%  1%  90% 
1994  23.068  3.009  26.077  94.09  120.167  19%  3%  78% 
1995  39.033  9.981  49.014  143.034  192.048  20%  5%  74% 
1996  18.845  23.036  41.881  90.13  132.011  14%  17%  68% 
1997  26.567  20.289  46.856  120.518  167.374  16%  12%  72% 
1998  23.214  16.831  40.045  98.94  138.985  17%  12%  71% 
1999  31.699  22.61  54.309  96.25  150.559  21%  15%  64% 
2000  52.741  19.579  72.32  124.268  196.588  27%  10%  63% 
2001  53.869  18.494  72.363  113.292  185.655  29%  10%  61% 
2002  17.581  17.016  34.597  113.371  147.968  12%  11%  77% 
Source: Dubois and Moura 2004. 
Finally, our model hypothesizes that PPPs need to provide benefits to their targeted beneficiary 
(requirement 1).  While large, export-oriented farms would be the main beneficiary of FMD control 
policies, such PPPs also need to be as inclusive as possible and incorporate smallholders, given that the 
disease control efforts of smallholders are pivotal for arresting disease in a country as a whole.  
                                                       
4  See Gartlan 2004; CattleNetwork.com 2005; Kingstone 2005.   
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Consequently, incentives need to be provided to smallholders to enable them to become active partners in 
such programs (Rich, Winter-Nelson, and Brozovic 2005).  However, partnerships such as SISBOV have 
run into problems recently due to conflicts among producers, meat packers, and the government over 
tracing animals back to the farm or on an individual basis (USDA-FAS 2005).  In the case of the last 
outbreak, an examination of the pattern of the 2005–06 outbreaks reveals that farms with fewer than 46 
head of livestock accounted for nearly 27 percent of the outbreaks, which is slightly below the average 
distribution of cattle holdings in Mato Grosso do Sul that prevailed in 1996 (37 percent, see Figure 8).  
Indeed, it appears that outbreaks were more prevalent among medium-scale producers (46–161 heads), 
who, like smallholders, nevertheless represent an important constituency in ensuring successful FMD 
control efforts. 
Figure 8. Distribution of farms affected by foot-and-mouth disease in Brazil, 2005-06, compared 
with statewide distribution (1996) 
 
Source: Derived from data in ABIEC 2006; 1996 Agricultural Census. 
The lesson from this case is that while PPPs have been partially successful in reducing FMD in 
Brazil, future programs need to create partnership mechanisms that address more areas of the supply 
chain and that can be sustained over time.  Correa Melo and Saraiva (2003) conclude that sustainable 
partnerships require funding sources that do not rely on the public sector, such as those acquired from fees 
on livestock sales.  At the same time, any funding, management, or organizational mechanism to eradicate 
FMD should be sensitive to the constraints of smallholders (both in Brazil and in neighboring countries), 
whose cooperation in disease control is fundamental to success. 










Less than 46  46-161  161-643  Over 643 










Distribution of outbreaks in Mato Grosso do Sul 
Distribution of livestock in Mato Grosso do Sul  
24 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Market failures are unfortunately a major component of agriculture in developing countries.  The 
transition of agriculture toward high-value commodities presents new challenges for producers, 
particularly smallholders, who wish to access these new supply chains.  Public and private institutions are 
themselves often incapable of overcoming these market failures for smallholders, implying the need to 
examine new modalities for assisting the poor. 
In this paper, we examined how public–private partnerships (PPPs) that combine the strengths of 
each sector and that utilize integrated interventions at different points in the supply chain can serve as a 
major force for smallholder integration into commercialized agriculture.  By strengthening linkages 
across supply chain actors, PPPs can create chain-level solutions to conventional market failures.  
According to the conceptual model, the benefits of PPPs must be transmitted at the chain level and must 
induce benefits for all participants.  While the case study examples showed the means by which the poor 
have been integrated into formal markets through such partnerships, chain partnerships can in some cases 
bypass smallholders under the guise of chain-wide efficiency.  However, the FMD case in Brazil revealed 
that ignoring smallholder production systems puts the gains of the PPPs in jeopardy.  Additional work is 
required to determine ways to develop modalities with chain actors to integrate smallholders through such 
partnerships. 
The FMD case showed that PPPs can fail when they do not consider all elements of the supply 
chain and/or when mechanisms to ensure their long-term viability are not established.  The sustainability 
of PPPs in supply chains clearly needs further elaboration in future research.  In particular, it is unclear 
how partnerships would evolve in the face of rising competition, either domestic or global, and whether 
they could lead to opportunities for smallholders to upgrade and innovate supply chains.  A dynamic 
perspective is necessary to assess these considerations.   
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